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INTRODUCTION 
 
The ability of sports governing bodies to control their respective sports is one that has come 
under growing pressure in recent years. As sport has become increasingly globalised and the 
commercial value of elite sport has swelled exponentially – particularly in respect of media rights 
– new challenges to the regulatory capacity of sports governing bodies have become manifest. 
 
The nature of the growth of modern sport – principally on a self-regulatory, private basis, 
separate from state intervention – means that sports governing bodies may have de facto 
regulatory monopoly over their particular sport, but that they have no formal de jure right to 
regulatory oversight and control. This leaves these bodies, and the sports they regulate, 
vulnerable to external threats to their regulatory autonomy, particularly from those who wish to 
exploit sport’s commercial potential. 
 
This article explains and assesses the various means by which the regulatory authority of sports 
governing bodies may fall subject to challenge, before moving to consider the legal approaches to 
such challenges and to the monopoly position held by sports bodies. The article further considers 
the protections available to sports regulators under a variety of intellectual property provisions 
before concluding with proposals for a new approach which balances demands for the regulation 
of sports in a manner consistent with the public interest, while adequately protecting sports 
governing bodies from having control of their sport – either partial or total –wrested from them. 
 
SETTING THE SCENE: COMPETITION FOR CONTROL OF SPORTS AND EVENTS 
 
For the most part, the organisations which regulate sports grew up organically, initially as a 
means of facilitating participation and competition and, latterly, as providers of more 
sophisticated regulatory authority and frameworks.1 Generally speaking there has been little 
competition from would-be alternative regulators, with most challenges to regulatory authority 
coming through objections to the substance of regulation and practice by those subject to the 
regime. Most typically these challenges have come from athletes,2 clubs3 and other stakeholders – 
such as competition organisers4 – with, usually, economic interests in the sport. 
 
For the bulk of the modern era of sports regulation, sports governing bodies – both domestically 
and globally – have been able to utilise their positions of dominance to achieve universal control 
over their sport. The threat of exclusion from participation has usually been sufficient to deter 
any threat of breakaway and to maintain a regulatory monopoly in a given sport. For much of this 
period there has been limited threat from would-be alternative regulatory bodies largely due to 
the lack of any real incentive, and the risks inherent in any failure. Until relatively recently, even 
with the early advent of television, the economic value of sport has been insufficient to provoke 
many attempts at a ‘takeover’.  
 
This is not to say that there are no examples of successful regulatory takeover or breakaways: 
the association football and rugby football codes are examples of early splits – predominantly 
based on differences as to how the sport should be played – and the existence of rugby league is 
owed to a schism in a once unified sport with the creation of the ‘Northern Union’ in 1913. The 
league/union split, however, came about as a dispute over professionalism and the payment of 
players; as such it can be seen as an example of players asserting their economic rights, rather 
than an attempt to wrest control of the game from the established authorities. In any case the 
football/rugby and league/union splits can be reasonably categorised as formative parts of the 
process of individual sports emerging from folk practice and from numerous early disparate, 
though similar, codified versions. There are very few examples of mainstream sports or sports 
regulators which have emerged outside of this period of codification and regularisation.5 
 
Latterly, however, there exists a growing threat to the continuing monopolistic authority of 
sports governing bodies, principally driven by the substantial economic value of the media rights 
associated with them. By way of example, in the most recent round of television rights sales, the 
English Premier League was able to elicit £5.136bn for domestic rights and a further £3bn from 
overseas markets for the period 2016-19. Similarly, global broadcasting revenues for the Indian 
Premier League (IPL) cricket tournament ran to US$1.026bn over ten years from 2008. The 
importance of sports media rights, in particular football, is exemplified by their description by 
Rupert Murdoch as the “battering ram” with which he would enter and establish BSkyB in the 
pay-television market. BT Sport has pursued a vigorous strategy in acquiring sports rights in its 
efforts to establish itself as a serious competitor to Sky. The ferocity with which media outlets 
have challenged each other for such rights, both through the bidding process and through 
litigation, is a further indication of their importance.6 A parallel marker is the seriousness with 
which the sale of media rights to major sporting events and competitions has been treated by 
competition authorities, in particular the European Commission.7 
 
The sums involved have acted as a driver for existing and would be stakeholders to seek a 
greater share of the pot. In respect of athletes this has principally been through seeking to enforce 
their economic and labour rights – such as through the Bosman litigation and the recent 
complaint to the European Commission by FIFPro, seeking to challenge the basis on which 
professional players are employed.8 In team sports, where professional clubs are key 
stakeholders, they have often sought to act together to take control – either partial or total – of the 
regulation of the sport as a whole, or to act to a significant degree independently of the regulator 
in operating their own competitions.  
 
Challenges to the regulatory autonomy of established sports governing bodies can manifest 
themselves in many different ways dependent upon the nature of the sport, its organisational 
structures, the relative strength of the various stakeholder groups within it, and its economic 
attractiveness to broadcasters and other commercial concerns. These can be characterised under 
four broad headings. 
 
‘Hard’ break-away 
One means by which the supremacy of traditional sports governing bodies has been challenged is 
through the creation of rival organisations and or competitions. The most obvious example of this 
is in the world of professional boxing, where there currently exist a number of parallel ‘world’ 
federations. Boxing is perhaps slightly anomalous given that there has never been an outright 
global regulator, but a number of competing ‘regulators’ vying for position over a period of 
time.9  
 
However, professional darts provides a good example with the creation in 1993 of the World 
Darts Council (WDC) as a competitor regulator to the established World Darts Federation 
(WDF). The ‘break-away’ WDC was supported by a group of professionals, including most or all 
of the best known and most successful, and by a television deal with Sky Sports. The dispute was 
ultimately settled by an agreement that the WDC would recognise the WDF as the international 
governing body and rename itself as the Professional Darts Council (PDC). The result has been 
that there exist separate groups of players and largely separate tournaments, with two distinct 
World Professional Darts Championship competitions. 
 
Perhaps the most prominent example of the creation of a rival regulator or competition is that of 
World Series Cricket. In May 1977 World Series Cricket (WSC), a company managed by the 
Australian entrepreneur Kerry Packer, announced that it had secretly signed up thirty four of the 
world’s foremost cricketers to play in a series of ‘Super Tests’ in Australia. Packer’s decision to 
create a rival organisation to the traditional organisers of world cricket was borne of a decision by 
the Australian Cricket Board (now Cricket Australia) to award broadcasting rights for the 
Australia Test team’s matches to the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC), rather than 
Packer’s commercial Channel 9 broadcasting company. This was despite Channel 9 having made 
a higher value bid for the rights. In July 1977 the International Cricket Council (ICC) – the world 
governing body of cricket – seeking to protect it’s monopoly control of cricket at international 
level, altered its rules so that players taking part or making themselves available to play in a 
match previously disapproved of by the ICC, after October 1 1977, would be disqualified from 
taking part in test cricket without the express consent of the ICC. At the same time the ICC 
issued a resolution specifically disapproving of any match organised by WSC. The ICC also 
recommended that national governing bodies take similar action in respect of their domestic 
game. The English Test and County Cricket Board (TCCB – now reformed as the England and 
Wales Cricket Board (ECB)) then resolved to alter its rules so that any player who was subject to 
the test match ban would also be disqualified from taking part in first class county cricket. The 
litigation which followed (discussed below) ultimately meant that WSC ran for only two seasons 
until 1979, when Packer and the ACB came to a rapprochement, with Packer and Channel 9 
becoming a key partner for the ACB. 
 
‘Soft’ break-away 
 
A further means by which established regulatory regimes can be challenged is by ‘soft’ break-
away. In such circumstances it is generally the case that a small number of leading participants – 
either athletes or clubs, dependent upon the nature of the sport – seek to set up a new competition 
which although, on the face of it, appears to be a straightforward reorganisation of existing 
structures, amounts to a significant reapportionment of power and resources. A prime example of 
this is the ‘break-away’ of top division clubs in English football, with the creation of the Premier 
League in 1992. On its face this appeared to be a replacement of the existing Division One of the 
Football League on a like-for-like basis. The reality is that the new configuration amounted to a 
‘land-grab’ by the top clubs – supported by the overall regulator, the Football Association, but 
opposed by the traditional organiser of the league competition, the Football League – as a means 
of securing the bulk of the television revenues available from the newly emerged commercial, 
satellite broadcasters. The result was that, although the league arrangements looked broadly 
similar to the previous arrangements – four divisions with promotion and relegation between 
them – the revenues created by televising the top division were no longer shared with those 
below. Instead, the Football League was largely left to fend for itself. A similar position 
developed in Scotland, though a subsequent re-amalgamation has now occurred.  
 
Regulatory Capture 
 
An alternate, sometimes parallel, means by which regulators can experience challenge to their 
regulatory monopoly is by way of regulatory capture, where a stakeholder or group of 
stakeholders deploy a position of strength in order to exercise a degree of control over the 
regulator. As well as being a ‘soft’ break-away, the Premier League has been identified as 
holding such a position of strength over the regulator of English football, the Football 
Association. The Premier League has been criticised by a Parliamentary Select Committee as 
holding too great an influence on the governance of the sport in England, at the expense of the 
“National Game”.10 
 
Similarly, UEFA – European football’s governing body – has within it the European Club 
Association (ECA). This group, representing the major European club sides, was created as part 
of a deal with a previously independent group of clubs known as the G14, an association of the 
highest profile European clubs. Under the arrangement the G14 dissolved and was effectively 
absorbed into UEFA. This was part of a package of measures aimed at alleviating and addressing 
the concerns of these clubs – resulting in a much greater degree of influence in the regulatory 
body. 
 
Collaboration 
 
Control of particular sports has also shifted by way of negotiation or collaboration, usually with 
media partners. Rugby League is a principle example of this, with the professional game at the 
highest level having been repackaged and re-branded in order to create a product attractive to 
television viewers. The creation of Superleague and the move to summer, rather than the 
traditional winter season, was predicated on an agreement with Rupert Murdoch’s News 
Corporation. In the United Kingdom the regulator and broadcaster worked together to refashion 
the league competition. Though some early proposals to merge some existing club sides were met 
with fierce resistance by clubs and fans, the collaboration ultimately involved a smooth transition 
from the ‘old’ to the ‘new’. This was in stark contrast to the position in Australia and New 
Zealand where a fierce battle was fought for control involving rival broadcasters and the 
regulator.11 This led to two competitor leagues being played during the 1997 season, before a 
settlement was reached and a single competition embedded. 
 
LEGAL RESPONSES TO BREAK-AWAY 
 
The position as set out above raises serious concerns as to the sustainability of credibility of 
sport’s regulatory structures. The capacity of regulators to effectively ‘steward’ their sport is 
undermined by the threat of challenge and of being stripped of control of some, if not all, of the 
sport under their control.  
 
The importance of the stability of these regulators has been emphasised a number of times by 
the English courts. In McInnes v Onslow-Fane McGarry V-C highlighted that, “[b]odies such as 
the [British Boxing Board of Control] which promote a public interest by seeking to maintain 
high standards in a field of activity which might otherwise become degraded and corrupt ought 
not to be hampered in their work without good cause.”12 The importance of this stability is 
further emphasised by the judicial creation of a special private law supervisory jurisdiction under 
which courts will scrutinise the activities of sports governing bodies;13 this is in no small part due 
to judicial desire to avoid overburdening bodies and frustrating their important public interest 
role. 
 
As is suggested above, many instances of attempted breakaway or to otherwise effect a shift in 
control result in litigation. The case of Greig v Insole, the facts of which are related above, is an 
important example of this, as it provides an indication of judicial attitudes.  
 
In Greig Slade J. decided that both the ICC and TCCB had legitimate interests which they were 
entitled to protect. The ICC argued that it was acting reasonably in introducing rules which would 
effectively protect it from the competition provided by WSC. Test Match cricket provided a large 
proportion of the money through which the game at lower levels was financed. Thus, the ICC 
argued, it was acting reasonably in aiming to prevent players from taking part in a competition 
which could threaten the existence of Test Match cricket, and result in cricket suffering at all 
levels. Slade J. did accept that WSC posed at least a short term threat, but that this was not 
particularly serious and indeed that the profile of cricket could be raised. However, the long term 
threat, Slade J. decided, could be adequately met by the imposition of a prospective ban on 
players playing in unsanctioned games. Though such bans would not necessarily be valid they 
could be more easily justified than the retrospective action taken in the case of the clamiants. 
Notably then, the Court recognised the importance of a single regulatory body which operated not 
just for the benefit of the ‘elite’, commercially attractive element of the game, but which also had 
a significant role in overseeing and promoting grass-roots activity. Slade J acknowledged that the 
game of cricket should be taken in its entirety and that the regulation of the whole of the sport 
was sufficiently important to permit limits on competing organisations such as World Series 
Cricket. 
 
PUBLIC INTEREST MONOPOLY VS ABUSE OF POWER 
 
Greig, though ultimately a success for the regulator, also highlights a tension between monopoly 
control by sports governing bodies – with attendant risks of abuse and problems of a lack of 
competition – and the public interest in sport’s effective regulation. This issue has been 
considered in detail by the Court of Justice of the European Union in the case of Motosykleistiki 
Omospondia Ellados Npid v Elliniko Dimosio (MOTOE).14 
 
In MOTOE Greek legislation empowered the domestic body nominated by the International 
Motorcycling Federation (FIM) to authorise sporting competitions for motorcycles. The 
organisation appointed by the FIM was Elliniki Leshki Aftokinitoy kai Periigiseon (ELPA) 
which, as a consequence, had the right of veto over all races within the Greece. Would-be event 
organisers were required to submit a request for authorisation to ELPA, giving details of the 
venue or route and the safety measures. The new event could not clash with existing 
arrangements and the organisers were required to have their sponsors approved by ELPA. 
Consequently ELPA had a potential advantage in the organisation of motorcycle events where it 
acted in a commercial capacity, because of its regulatory monopoly over their approval and 
regulation. MOTOE applied to ELPA for a licence, but received no response. After a number of 
months, MOTOE brought a challenge to ELPA in the Greek courts, on the basis that the 
combination of ELPA’s regulatory and commercial functions gave it a monopoly position which 
was open to abuse, contrary to EU competition provisions. The Greek court made a reference to 
the Court of Justice of the European Union seeking, amongst other things, clarification of the 
compatibility with European Union competition law of ELPA’s combination of regulatory 
monopoly and commercial activities. 
 
In applying Article 82 EC (now Article 102 TFEU) the Court acknowledged that ELPA was 
operating in two separate markets, first in the organisation of motorcycle events and, second, the 
commercial exploitation of those events through sponsorship, advertising and insurance 
activities. The Court identified the possession of special or exclusive powers as permitting ELPA 
to determine the extent of other undertakings’ access to the market, and that this could put ELPA 
in a dominant position: 
 
“51. A system of undistorted competition, such as that provided for by the Treaty, can be 
guaranteed only if equality of opportunity is secured as between the various economic 
operators. To entrust a legal person such as ELPA, which itself organises and 
commercially exploits motorcycling events, the task of giving the competent 
administration its consent to applications for authorisation to organise such events, is 
tantamount de facto to conferring upon it the power to designate the persons authorised to 
organise those events and to set the conditions in which those events are organised, 
thereby placing that entity at an obvious advantage over its competitors. Such a right may 
therefore lead the undertaking which possesses it to deny other operators access to the 
relevant market. That situation of unequal conditions of competition is also highlighted 
by the fact, confirmed at the hearing before the Court, that, when ELPA organises or 
participates in the organisation of motorcycling events, it is not required to obtain any 
consent in order that the competent administration grant it the required authorisation. 
52. Furthermore, such a rule, which gives a legal person such as ELPA the power to give 
consent to applications for authorisation to organise motorcycling events without that 
power being made subject by that rule to restrictions, obligations and review, could lead 
the legal person entrusted with giving that consent to distort competition by favouring 
events which it organises or those in whose organisation it participates.” 
 
This emphasises the problems which may arise as a consequence of the monopoly position of a 
sports governing body. Though the Court of Justice was somewhat reluctant to provide specific 
guidance as to when abuse might arise in this context – the matter was raised by way of 
preliminary reference meaning the Court was not required to determine the outcome of the case – 
it does make clear in its judgment that such power must be carefully exercised.15 
 
The MOTOE litigation is not the only example of this sort of scenario which has come under 
scrutiny from the law. In FIA & Formula One the European Commission investigated the 
governing body of world motorsport.16 The Commission reviewed the FIA’s regulations and 
commercial agreements relating to the FIA Formula One Championship in the light of requests 
for clearance from European competition rules. The Commission raised objections, arguing that 
FIA had abused its power by restricting promoters, circuit owners, vehicle manufacturers and 
drivers in ways that went beyond that necessary to protect its legitimate interests. The 
Commission accepted the necessity for sports governing bodies to exercise effective control over 
sports, sporting rules and competitions, but determined nonetheless that the notable commercial 
interests tied into Formula One required conformity with the demands of European Union 
competition law. Following discussions with the Commission the FIA agreed to change its 
regulations, agreeing to: limit its role to that of a sports regulator, with no commercial conflicts of 
interest; to exercise its licensing powers in such a way as to impose limitations on new 
competitions only on grounds related to the safe, fair or orderly conduct of motor sport; and to 
strengthen both internal and external appeals processes. As a result, the FIA leased for a period of 
100 years its rights in the FIA Formula One World Championship and agreed to allow the 
creation of competing races and series.  
 
A complete severing of regulatory and commercial functions is not necessarily a rigid 
requirement, Advocate-General Kokott noted in MOTOE: 
 
“89. […] If the behaviour of an undertaking in a dominant position can be objectively 
justified, it is not abuse. In fact, in a case such as this, there may be objective reasons why 
an association such as ELPA refuses to give its consent to the authorisation of a 
motorcycling event. 
90. The existence of such an objective reason is particularly evident where, at a planned 
motorcycling event, the safety of the racers and spectators would not be guaranteed 
because the organiser did not take the appropriate precautions. 
91. However, in addition to the purely technical safety requirements, there may be other 
objective reasons for refusing consent which relate to the particular characteristics of the 
sport. In a case such as this, it is worth bearing in mind the following considerations. 
92. Firstly, it is in the interests of the sportspersons concerned, but also of the spectators 
and the public in general, that, for each sport, rules that are as uniform as possible apply 
and are observed so as to ensure that competitions are conducted in a regulated and fair 
manner. This applies not only to the frequently discussed anti-doping rules, but also to 
the ordinary rules of sport. If rules varied greatly from one organiser to another, it would 
be more difficult for sportspersons to participate in competitions and to compare their 
respective performances; the public’s interest in and recognition of the sport in question 
might also suffer. 
93. Consequently, the fact that an organisation such as ELPA makes the grant of its 
consent to the authorisation of a motorcycling event subject to compliance with certain 
internationally recognised rules cannot automatically be regarded as abuse. […] 
94. Secondly, it is in the interests of the sportspersons participating in the event, but also 
of the spectators and the public in general, that the individual competitions in a particular 
sport are incorporated into an overarching framework so that, for example, a specific 
timetable can be followed. It may make sense to prevent clashes between competitions so 
that both sportspersons and spectators can participate in as many such events as possible. 
95. Consequently, the fact that an organisation such as ELPA makes the grant of consent 
to the authorisation of a motorcycling event subject to the requirement that the event must 
not clash with other events that have already been planned and authorised cannot 
automatically be regarded as an abuse. However, it goes without saying in this regard 
that, when establishing a national Greek annual programme for motorcycling events, 
ELPA must not give preference to the events (co-)organised or marketed by it over those 
of other, independent organisers. 
96. The pyramid structure that has developed in most sports helps to ensure that the 
special requirements of sport, such as uniform rules and a uniform timetable for 
competitions, are taken into account. An organisation such as ELPA, which is the official 
representative of the FIM in Greece, is part of that pyramid structure. Under its right of 
co-decision in the authorisation by a public body of motorcycling events, it may 
legitimately assert the interests of sport and, if necessary, refuse to give its consent. 
However, a refusal to grant consent becomes an abuse where it has no objective 
justification in the interests of sport, but is used arbitrarily to promote the organisation’s 
own economic interests, to the detriment of other service providers that would like to 
organise, and above all market, motorcycling events on their own responsibility.” 
 
This approach is consistent with that adopted by the High Court in Hendry v World 
Professional Billiards and Snooker Association where the combination of regulatory and 
commercial functions was not seen as objectionable per se.17 In Hendry a group of professional 
snooker players brought a challenge against the World Professional Billiards and Snooker 
Association (WPBSA) – the governing body of the sport – claiming that a rule limiting 
participation WPBSA approved tournaments amounted to an abuse of a dominant position. 
Notably, the players in the Hendry litigation were joined as claimants by 110 Sports – a company 
involved in the commercial aspects of professional snooker. This, in particular, emphasises that 
the range of potential stakeholders is much wider than those – such as players and clubs – more 
usually associated with challenges of this kind. 
 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND CONTROL OF SPORTS 
 
One potential alternative approach to the protection of sports events is through the imaginative 
application of intellectual property rights.18 Given that there has historically been limited 
necessity for such an approach, this is a relatively untried area of law. There is however, settled 
law on the existence of an intellectual property right, as such, in a sporting event. In Victoria 
Park Racing v Taylor it was established that a platform erected on land adjoining a racecourse, 
from which radio commentary was relayed, was not unlawful as there was no cause of action 
upon which the claimants could found an action.19 There was, it seems, no intellectual property 
right in a sporting event – the law had nothing upon which it could bite. This approach has, in 
broad terms, been followed since. In BBC v Talksport the BBC was unable to protect its 
exclusive rights to broadcast live radio commentary of the Euro2000 football tournament against 
commentary on television pictures broadcast “as live”.20 Similarly in Murphy v Media Protection 
Sevices the Court of Justice of the Euorpean Union acknowledged the lack of any right in a sport 
itself.21 There have been some successes for event owners preventing ambush marketing through 
association with a competition or sport, primarily through the application of passing-off. Such 
litigation has generally been in respect of advertising and product promotions that draw links 
with a sport or event, rather than an organisation wishing to set up a rival organisation or 
competition. 
 
Passing-off could arguably afford some protection to sports governing bodies; it is certainly 
possible to suggest that governing bodies, through their good regulation of the game, could build 
up ‘goodwill’ in their product. Whether the claim to be operating a particular sport could be an 
actionable misrepresentation is not clear. Further, whether the consumer would recognise the 
governing body of a particular sport as creating the goodwill in their product is doubtful; in 
Rugby Football Union Ltd v Cotton Traders, the High Court judged that consumers of replica 
team shirts of the England Rugby Union side made their associations with the team and players, 
rather than with the RFU as an organisation.22 This may serve as a significant limitation – in any 
case, the law of passing-off is limited to England and Wales; on this basis it would have little 
application in the context of global sport.  
 
The potentially most useful approach to using intellectual property rights in protecting sports as 
a whole is that of the protection of formats. This has provided the foundation for significant 
commercial exploitation of, in particular, television shows. The leading case in this respect – 
Green v New Zealand Broadcasting Corp – demonstrates both the potential and the limitations 
for the application of this approach.23 In Green the case concerned the alleged infringement of the 
format rights in the popular talent show, Opportunity Knocks, in a show broadcast by the NZBC. 
The claim, based on infringement of copyright, was ultimately unsuccessful. This was on the 
basis that there were too few common elements as between the ‘original’ product and the 
allegedly infringing show. The court held that the key characteristics of the rights holder’s show 
were not sufficiently faithfully replicated to evidence infringement. How, then, could this assist 
sports governing bodies in protecting their sports against ‘free-riders’? The key element of sports 
in this respect are the rules that govern the game – though these have evolved, in many cases over 
a century or more – it is certainly arguable that the governing body of a sport has intellectual 
property rights in the format of the sport. It could equally be argued that even if such a right were 
to exist, it would, by now, have expired. However, more modern incarnations of particular sports, 
most obviously the example of Twenty20 Cricket, outlined above, must have potential to secure 
this type of protection. The new take on the game of cricket, which was fashioned by Stuart 
Robertson, then an employee of the England and Wales Cricket Board (ECB), has proven 
immensely popular in both domestic and international cricket. It has become to be perceived as 
the commercial ‘powerhouse’ on which many other, wider facets of the game of cricket can be 
founded. There do not seem to have been any claims made as to ‘ownership’ of the format as 
against other competitions – and perhaps, within the context of cricket’s established regulatory 
structures, this is consistent with the idea of ‘ownership’ being attributed to those charged with 
stewardship of the game. It is surprising, particularly in the context of an environment where 
certain national regulators have been vociferous in their protection of their competitions, that 
litigation has not been launched on this basis. 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSALS: BALANCING REGULATORY STABILITY AND 
REGULATORY FAIRNESS 
 
Sport needs unified and consistent regulation by its very nature; meaningful competition 
necessarily means playing by a uniform set of rules. The application of such a set of rules does 
not, of necessity, require that all competitions fall under the ‘ownership’ of the regulator, but it 
would certainly seem appropriate that, where the adoption of a sport by an ‘unofficial’ operator 
occurs, the regulator have some capacity to limit such activity in as much as it is damaging to the 
‘greater good’ of the game. The tension between the public interest in the effective administration 
of sport and the economic interests of the various stakeholders in sport is manifest, but the law 
offers only piecemeal responses to the management of the problem. This, arguably, breeds 
uncertainty and conflict which, ultimately go against the best interests of sport and those involved 
with it. 
 
How, then, can the law effect appropriate levels of protection for sports governing bodies – as 
‘stewards’ of their sports – whilst preventing abuse of that position? The answer, I argue, is for 
the development of a sui generis intellectual property right in each sport, to be granted to 
recognised governing bodies, both at international and domestic level. This right would provide 
legal recognition and protection for sports governing bodies as ‘custodians’ of their respective 
sports. As such, an enforceable intellectual property right would prevent would-be challengers to 
sports regulators from breaking-away or, where external parties are involved, ‘cherry-picking’ the 
most commercially attractive parts of a given sport. 
 
This proposal clearly reinforces the existing monopoly position of sports governing bodies, and 
with it the attendant possibilities of abuse. However, the granting of such a right would have 
attached to it responsibilities, in particular the equitable and fair treatment of those parties 
wishing to operate their own competitions under the auspices of the rights holder. In particular 
this could reflect the Opinion of Advocate-General Kokott in MOTOE on the appropriate balance 
between legitimate regulatory constraint and unreasonable commercial restriction. It might even 
extend to a requirement that sports governing bodies are limited to regulatory-only functions and 
that they do not engage in potentially conflicting commercial activities. Further it might 
reasonably compel a sports governing body to license at least some competitions, similar to 
provisions already existing in mainstream intellectual property law provisions.24 
 
The potential for such a scheme to be rolled out is clearly evidenced by the successful 
development and deployment of the World Anti-Doping Code (WADC). Almost all major, 
mainstream sports have been brought under the umbrella of the WADC – indeed this is a 
condition of a sport’s inclusion in the Olympic Games25 – and it has proven effective as a quasi-
constitutional code, overriding conflicting rules and decisions of individual sports governing 
bodies.
26 Notably the WADC and its parent organisation, the World Anti-Doping Agency, are both 
supported and endorsed by nation states and by UNESCO, through the International Convention 
against Doping in Sport. 
 
Arguably such an approach can provide certainty for sports regulators, while also ensuring that 
their conduct is not restrictive. Taken together this can be seen as providing stability, protecting 
the public interest in the regulation of sport, while permitting economic interests to be pursued. In 
particular this can be seen as elevating sporting interests above the commercial, not least by 
removing the fate of sports from the vagaries of the market. 
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